Here, the Claimant ("PP"), applied for summary judgment in the sum of £112,997.95 plus interest relying upon a correction made by an adjudicator on 5 December 2014 to an Award he had previously made on 26 November 2014. The Defendant ("GOL") resisted the application on the basis that the Adjudicator’s correction was made out of time and was of no effect.
By a contract made on 17 January 2013 GOL engaged PP to act as its subcontractor and to carry out works on the concrete frame at the Chichester Festival Theatre.
The contract provided for disputes to be referred to adjudication and Clause 70 of the Contract Conditions made express provision for the correction of errors in an award within 14 days of the notification of the decision to the parties. Any such correction was to be made and notified to the parties within 7 days from when such initiative was taken or such request was made.
When a dispute arose over payments alleged to be due to PP, the Adjudicator was appointed. He issued his Award on 26 November 2014 directing GOL to pay PP £229,005 plus VAT and applicable interest.
On the same day, by email PP identified that the Adjudicator’s calculation, for arriving at the figure, was incorrect. However, the error was only vaguely identified and the attachment explaining the error was difficult to read. The Adjudicator sought clarification and a subsequent request was made by email on 28 November 2014, which enabled the Adjudicator to amend his decision.
On 30 November 2014 the Adjudicator replied, accepting that PP was correct to point to a clerical error (namely that 5% had been taken twice) and that it was a slip to be corrected. He then set out what he described as "the correct approach (draft for comment here)". His revised calculation led to a balance of £321,536 and interest which he calculated as being £5,616 to 3 December 2014 and running from that date at £76.19 per day on the aggregated sum of £327,152.00.
It was accepted that the email of 30 November was not itself a correction of the clerical mistake within the meaning of clause 70(9).
On 4 December 2014 PP's solicitors replied to the Adjudicator:
"Further to our email dated 1 December and confirmation of our agreement to the correction of the slip to your Decision, please can you issue your revised Decision."
No email of 1 December 2014 was received by the Adjudicator or by GOL's solicitors. In these circumstances, PP rightly accepted that the possibility of an email having been drafted was irrelevant and that it was not sent.
On 5 December 2014, PP's solicitors chased the Adjudicator by a further email, apologising for chasing him and asking him to issue his revised Decision. The Adjudicator issued his "Slip Award" that day, which incorporated the calculation he had sent to the parties in draft on 30 November 2014. GOL has paid the sums required to be paid by the original award but has not paid the difference between those sums and the substituted sums included in the Slip Award.
It follows from the summary provided above that the issues raised by GOL were:
(a) Whether the email and attachment on 26 November 2014 were a "request" within the meaning of Clause 70(9)?
(b) If the email and attachment on 26 November 2014 were not a "request" within the meaning of Clause 70(9), did PP issue a "request" within the meaning of the Clause at a later date?
(c) If the email and attachment on 26 November 2014 were a "request" within the meaning of Clause 70(9):
a) was it open to PP to issue another request within the meaning of the Clause and, if it was,
b) did PP issue another request within the meaning of the Clause?
c) If the answers to issues (a), (b) and (c(b)) are "No", did Mr Bingham correct his decision on his own initiative?
The Court found that the attachment as presented to the Adjudicator, on 26 November 2014, was unclear to the extent that a reasonable adjudicator who held himself out as competent to deal with the adjudication in hand would be, and was, justified in concluding that he could not reliably decipher it. That of itself means that the email and attachment did not constitute an operative request. However, the email and attachment on 28 November 2014 satisfied all the requirements of an operative request.
In these circumstances, it was not necessary to decide whether either or both of the emails of 4 December and 5 December 2014 were or were capable of being operative requests, as if the email and attachment of 28 November was an operative request, the Adjudicator corrected the error in time on 5 December 2014.
Accordingly, PP succeeded in its application for summary judgment.