Celtic employed Rok as a sub-contractor to provide an in-vessel composting facility at a site in Devon. The contract contained clause 28 from the CIC Model Adjudication Procedure 4th Edition which provided the adjudicator with the option, within 5 days of his decision, to correct it, to remove an accidental error or to clarify any ambiguity.
In an adjudication, Rok argued that it had or should be treated as having completed its sub-contract works on 8 June 2009: Celtic argued completion had not been achieved at all. The adjudicator decided that completion of the works was achieved on 8 June 2009; the first half of retention monies was due; the amount of LADs Celtic was entitled to, and those it was obliged to pay to Rok.
After receiving the decision Celtic emailed the adjudicator to request that he correct certain typographical errors in his decision, but also ‘clarify’ some of his findings. In particular Celtic wanted the adjudicator to open up certain payment certificates and clarify how much was payable and due to Rok. Celtic also alleged that Rok had misled the adjudicator with regards to how much it had and had not been paid.
The adjudicator responded stating he would correct the typographical errors to remove any ambiguity, but it would go beyond the terms of the clause 28 procedure to review the substance of his decision. He refused to make the other clarifications that Celtic sought.
Rok commenced enforcement proceedings. Celtic argued that the slip rule had not been operated properly and that there had been breaches of natural justice. Celtic complainted that the adjudicator failed to open up and review properly or at all certain payment certificates and that Rok had misled the adjudicator. It alleged that natural justice was breached as:
The judge did not think that the adjudicator had acted in breach of natural justice because it is not the function of the court to analyse the factual bases on which adjudicators reach their decisions and the argument about the adjudicator disregarding or attaching insufficient weight to Celtic’s evidence was “almost pointless”. Failing to organise a meeting between the parties was not an obvious breach of natural justice, as the adjudicator was not obliged to organise one and the parties had not complained at the time. And permitting Rok to submit a Scott Schedule was not a breach of natural justice either. All Rok was doing was responding to submissions made by Celtic, but in a schedule; if anything, it would have been a breach of natural justice for the adjudicator not to have considered this.
Furthermore, Rok had not misrepresented anything to the adjudicator and it was open to Celtic to rebut these misrepresentations during the adjudication itself. It was difficult to allege the adjudicator had acted unfairly in circumstances where he was unaware of any misrepresentation.
With regard to the operation of the slip rule the judge stated that Clause 28 of the Adjudication Procedure gave the adjudicator discretion to remove any accidental error or omission, or clarify any ambiguity. It did not give him the right to “correct so as wholly to reconsider and re-draft substantive parts of his decision and in effect to change his mind on material points of principle”. The judge stated the adjudicator was the person best placed to decide on any “accidental” error or omission and that there was nothing obviously accidental in what the adjudicator had decided. Similarly it had not been argued that there was any ambiguity in the adjudicator’s decision but in any event the judge did not consider there was any.
When Celtic tried to draw the adjudicator’s mathematical errors to the adjudicator himself, all it managed to do was present a complex series of calculations indicating as much, which the adjudicator found unsurprisingly incomprehensible. The certificate that Celtic said made the position clear was issued after the adjudicator’s decision was given, but this was at a time when the adjudicator could do nothing about it.
The judge concluded that the adjudicator was correct not to revise his decisions as Celtic had suggested and it was not unfair of him to do so. Any suggestion that the adjudicator acted unfairly in failing to provide full and detailed reasoning on certain points was an irrelevance: it was not necessary for an adjudicator to provide reasons why he found some evidence more compelling than others.