(i) The adjudication procedure does not involve the final determination of anybody's rights (unless all the parties so wish);
(ii) The Court of Appeal has repeatedly emphasised that adjudicators' decisions must be enforced, even if they result from errors of procedure, fact or law;
(iii) Where an adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction or in serious breach of the rules of natural justice, the court will not enforce his decision;
(iv) Judges must be astute to examine technical defences with a degree of scepticism consonant with the policy of the 1996 Act. Errors of law, fact or procedure by an adjudicator must be examined critically before the Court accepts that such errors constitute excess of jurisdiction or serious breaches of the rules of natural justice.
One of the issues discussed was Devonport's contention that the adjudicator's decision on defects was reached in breach of the rules of natural justice and was not supported by any, or any adequate, reasons. Here the adjudicator had reduced the Devonport claim for defects from £2.9million to £2.3million. In fact, Devonport suggested that their claim for defects was much higher, but the Judge accepted that the adjudicator had considered this aspect of the Devonport claim and rejected it. Accordingly, even if that decision was wrong, it could not be argued that it was something the adjudicator had failed to address.
Here, the adjudicator had accepted the original claim for defects, but made a modest reduction in quantum for what the Judge said were perfectly sensible reasons. This reduction amounted to about 20%, a small sum in the context of the overall dispute. The reduction in quantum was said by the Judge to be the result of the adjudicator casting a critical eye over the expert evidence.
This was precisely the kind of exercise which one would expect the adjudicator (who was himself an experienced engineer) to undertake. It was unrealistic in a case such as this, to expect an adjudicator, who may be struggling under tight time limits with a growing mass of evidence and legal submissions, as well as a barrage of intricate correspondence, to contact the parties and to invite their comments on a matter of this nature. Again, the Judge considered that the adjudicator had properly considered the claims put before him.
Mr Justice Jackson also had to consider interest. He thought that it made obvious commercial sense for an adjudicator to have the power to award interest. Here he agreed that paragraph 20(c) of the Scheme provided a freestanding power to the adjudicator to award interest whether or not there was an express term contained within the contract for the payment of interest.
The case also demonstrates how quickly enforcement cases can move. Here, there were 22 days between the commencement of this case and trial and judgment.